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Abstract*
 
 
This paper explores the role played by policy instruments in access to housing 
finance by low-income households. It also analyzes the impact of housing credit 
and subsidies on both the quality of life and the quality of dwelling of the 
beneficiaries. Using the Quality of Life Surveys conducted in Colombia in 2003 
and 2008, the study finds that policy instruments aimed at easing access of low-
income households to affordable housing such as subsidies and loan guarantees 
have played a modest role in increasing the use of mortgages as a source of 
funding. Despite this, subsidies were found to have had a significant impact on 
both the quality of dwelling and the quality of life. Therefore, this paper suggests 
promoting the use of both instruments by improving their design and targeting. 
 
JEL Classification: D61, H81, I30, I31, I32, I38, O17, R20, R28, R31, R38 
Keywords: Low-income housing, Housing finance, Housing subsidies, Quality of 
life, Quality of dwelling, Low-income housing mortgage market 
 
 
 
  
  
                                                 
* This paper was undertaken as part of the Latin American and Caribbean Research Network Project “Housing Finance in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: What Is Holding It Back?” 
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Executive Summary 
 
This study focuses on access to housing credit by the low-income population. The main objective 
is to determine the role of housing subsidies and partial credit guarantees in access to mortgages 
by low-income households. Additionally, the study analyzes the impact of housing credit and 
subsidies on the quality of life and the quality of dwelling of their beneficiaries. 
In Colombia, the housing deficit remains high (36.4 percent) and approximately 97 percent 
of the households facing this deficit belong to the lowest income segments. The housing deficit is 
mainly qualitative (23.8 percent), and the most widespread problem among the poorest families 
is lack of access to sewerage, followed by lack of access to proper drinking water networks. This 
situation is associated with low levels of housing finance. The mortgage portfolio in Colombia 
amounts to around 3 percent of GDP, while the Latin American average is close to 5 percent.  
The literature on housing finance in Colombia suggests that the main obstacles to 
increasing access to housing loans are related to low income, lack of information on borrowers’ 
ability to pay, high costs of recovering collateral, mortgage interest rate rigidities, and judicial 
insecurity. 
The main policy instruments addressing these obstacles are low-income housing subsidies 
and partial credit guarantees. The low-income housing subsidy, created in 1991, has been one of 
the main instruments of the low-income housing policy. It is a one-time direct subsidy to 
partially fund the purchase of affordable housing. The partial credit guarantees to low-income 
housing loans, implemented in 2004, address the obstacles of lack of collateral and costly 
collateral recovery. 
In this paper the beneficiaries of both housing subsidies and credit are characterized using 
data from the Quality of Life Surveys from 2003 and 2008 (QLS). From 2003 to 2008, the 
percentage of subsidy beneficiaries belonging to the three lowest income quintiles increased 
from 65 percent to 80 percent. However, in 2008 only a third of the subsidy beneficiaries were 
classified as poor according to the Index of Unmet Basic Needs (UBN). Credit access for the 
poorest segments of the population is even more difficult. More than 60 percent of the holders of 
housing loans belong to the two highest income quintiles, and only 11.8 percent are classified as 
poor by the UBN. 
The impact of housing subsidies and credit on the quality of dwelling and quality of life are 
estimated through the method of propensity score matching, using data from the QLS. The 
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determinants of access to housing subsidies and housing loans are estimated following the two-
step simultaneous estimation model of Maddala (1993).  
The results suggest that the low-income housing subsidy and housing credit improve the 
quality of dwelling and the quality of life among its beneficiaries, and is mainly allocated to low-
income populations. However, the subsidy fails to facilitate access to credit and has insufficient 
coverage among the poorest segments of the population, in part because they lack 
complementary funding. Evidence confirms the importance of collateral and income as 
determinants of access to credit. 
The partial credit guarantees program is focused on backing low-income housing credits, 
but its use by financial intermediaries is very limited. The determinants of holding a partial 
mortgage guarantee were estimated through a probit model, using data from a private bank. 
Results show that there is a significant relationship between the likelihood of holding a guarantee 
and having low income levels and low education levels. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The housing deficit in Colombia remains high (36.2 percent1
Housing finance in Colombia is small compared to Latin American standards. Mortgage 
loans ranged from 3.0 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP during the last five years, while the regional 
average is around 5 percent.
) despite the recovery of the sector 
after the crisis of the late 1990s. The literature suggests that formal housing in Colombia is 
constrained, among other factors, by land markets failures, lengthy and costly procedures for 
obtaining building permits, and low access to credit. 
2
Mortgage lending in Colombia funds less than a third of total housing, while the rest is 
financed by informal lenders or self-funded. Mortgage lending is concentrated in the formally 
employed segment, leaving out 70 percent of low-income housing demand,
 After the financial crisis of the late 1990s, which lasted from 1998 
to 2001, the Colombian mortgage market recovery has been weak. While the ratio of total loans 
increased from 23.8 percent of GDP in 2001 to 46.2 percent in 2008, mortgage credit dropped 
from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2001 to 3.5 percent in 2008.  
3 comprising 
households that earn their living from informal activities.4
The Colombian literature has identified two main constraints to access to credit, 
especially by low-income people. First, even though poor families usually manage to accumulate 
a significant amount of capital over the years by participating in self-help housing construction, 
they may not have access to credit because loan providers perceive a high risk of default from 
borrowers with low and volatile incomes (Galindo and Lora, 2005). In the same vein, Galindo 
and Hofstetter (2006) found that at the microeconomic level, interest rates are high due to the 
high credit risk assumed by lenders. Second, the supply of low-income housing credit is also 
constrained by the lack of collateral owing to deficiencies in deed registration and the high costs 
and length of time needed to recover collateral (Cárdenas and Badel, 2003).  
 The problem of labor informality, 
which reaches almost 65 percent in Colombia, is behind the housing deficit and the lack of 
credit, because standard financial instruments do not suit the particular needs of this population.  
                                                 
1 According to the National Department of Statistics (DANE), in 1993 the effective housing deficit was 53.7 
percent, dropping to 36.2 percent in 2005. 
2 Warnock and Warnock (2008). 
3 “Ciudades Amables” in National Planning Department (2005). 
4 Rocha, Sánchez, and Tovar (2007), estimate that a formal employee has a higher probability of accessing housing 
credit than an informal employee. 
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To promote the provision of low-income housing in Colombia, the government has 
implemented a number of instruments, including tax exemptions, partial credit guarantees, direct 
subsidies, and rediscount credits. However, the scope and effectiveness of these instruments have 
been limited. Access to housing by the poorest segments of the population is still significantly 
low. The program of subsidies for low-income housing, which provides direct, one-time 
subsidies to homebuyers, is the most important. The subsidy is expected to facilitate access to 
credit. Another instrument aimed at increasing access to credit is partial credit guarantee for low-
income housing credit, which addresses the obstacles related to lack of collateral and costly 
collateral recovery.  
This study focuses on access to housing credit by the low-income population. Its main 
objective is to determine the impact of public policies designed to stimulate low-income housing.  
Emphasis is placed on the effect of housing subsidies and partial credit guarantees on access to 
mortgages by low-income households and on the impact of subsidies on the quality of life and 
the quality of dwellings.   
The document is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review of 
housing credit in Colombia. Section 3 illustrates the main features of the low-income housing 
market in Colombia, as well as further details of the program of housing subsidies. Section 4 
focuses on the characteristics of housing policy instruments and regulation. Section 5 discusses 
the impact of subsidies and credit on the quality of life and the quality of housing. Section 6 
provides a summary of the characteristics of the loan guarantee program and its effect on easing 
access to credit. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The housing sector in Colombia has been widely studied, with papers focusing on the mortgage 
markets and particularly on low-income housing finance.  
Rocha, Sánchez, and Tovar (2007) suggest that informality, low income and lack of 
information on borrower’s ability to pay are the main barriers to access to credit by the low-
income population. According to the authors, the probability of getting a mortgage loan increases 
when households have been granted a subsidy, have high income, work in the formal sector, and 
have programmed savings accounts. They also point out that loan providers perceive that the 
income instability of informal workers leads to a high risk of nonpayment and, therefore, limit 
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their exposure to this population. They recommend promoting appropriate mechanisms of 
information sharing, such as programmed savings, which signal the capacity of making regular 
payments to the financial system. Similarly, Murcia et al. (2007) use the Quality of Life Survey 
of 2003 to analyze the socioeconomic determinants of access to mortgage loans and credit cards 
and find that the probability of having a mortgage loan increases by 11.7 percent for households 
in the higher quintile of the income distribution. This probability also rises if the household has a 
housing subsidy or if it is located in an urban area.  
Cárdenas and Badel (2003) suggest that the high cost of recovering collateral and judicial 
insecurity work against access to credit in Colombia. They also point out that the financial crisis 
of the late 1990s in Colombia was a consequence of the drop in housing prices and a significant 
increase in the value of indebtedness by households, which deteriorated the loan-to-value ratio in 
the market. 
According to Jaramillo and Cuervo (2009), the interest rate ceiling for housing loans is a 
costly rigidity for the mortgage markets. Loan providers have low incentives to supply low-
income housing loans at the regulated rate, since these loans are risky and small and their 
administrative costs are high. 
Among the studies focused on policy instruments for promoting the low-income housing 
market, Cuellar (2006) presents a thorough analysis of the evolution of the regulatory framework 
and its influence on the development of housing finance.  
The National Planning Department of Colombia (2007) evaluates the Urban Low-Income 
Housing Subsidies Program. The evidence shows that assets ownership, education level, and 
access to information determine access to the program. According to this study, the program has 
a positive and significant impact on the house and neighborhood physical conditions, as well as 
on the beneficiary households’ expenditure and savings. However, it does not estimate the effect 
of the subsidy on the access to housing finance. 
Finally, Marulanda, Paredes, and Fajury (2006) calculate the fiscal cost of the partial 
credit guarantees on mortgages, as well as the fiscal cost of tax exemptions designed to promote 
low-income housing supply. The authors indicate that these policy instruments are dispersed and 
lack a results-based orientation, limiting their impact.  
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3. The Low-Income Housing Market in Colombia 
 
3.1 Description of the Housing Deficit  
 
The housing deficit in Colombia was 36.1 percent in 2005, of which 12.4 percent was 
quantitative—that is, the lack of housing—and 23.8 percent was qualitative—that is, living in 
inadequate housing.5
In regard to the quality of dwellings, among the poorest households the most widespread 
problem is the lack of access to sewerage: 61.8 percent of households in the first income quintile 
and 43.7 percent of households in the second income quintile do not have indoor plumbing. Next 
in importance is the lack of access to water networks: 40.4 percent and 28.8 percent, in the first 
and second income quintile respectively, lack this service (Table 1). In addition, according to 
information provided by QLS on flooring and wall materials, among the poorest households the 
most common materials are bricks and cement. However, as Table 1 also shows, some houses in 
the first income quintile are still built out of adobe, zinc, cloth, cardboard, and other disposable 
materials (6.2 percent) and have dirt floors (19.7 percent).  
 According to the Quality of Life Survey (QLS) of 2008, the housing deficit 
slightly decreased, to 34.6 percent (3.9 million households). Among these households, 68.0 
percent belong to the first two income quintiles and their household heads are male (77.0 
percent), with no education or only primary education (72.5 percent), are informal workers (78.0 
percent) and live in cohabitation (45.8 percent).  
 
3.2 Evolution of Housing Construction  
 
During the last ten years construction of priority housing has increased, but the total low-income 
housing stock has decreased, especially in the recent economic downturn.  
  During the crisis of 1999, construction dropped to an annual average of 56,000 units, 43.4 
percent below the figure observed in the early 1990s. This reduction was mainly due to the fall in 
non-low-income housing construction, which decreased from an average of 67,000 units in 1990-
94 to 10,000 in 1998-2001, while low-income housing construction remained relatively constant 
and priority housing construction even rose from an average of 2,000 units to an average of 
16,000 units. Construction of all types of housing recovered during the period 2002-05, reaching 
                                                 
5 The 2005 figure corresponds to the National Census published by DANE (National Department of Statistics in 
Colombia). 
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an average of 106,000 units. During the recent economic downturn, new construction projects 
declined to 71,000 units on average in 2008-09, due to the fall in low-income and priority 
housing construction, which fell by half. In contrast to the crisis of the 1990s, this time non-low-
income housing only decreased by 17 percent (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. New Housing Units under Construction 
 
    Source: DANE (Construction Census, 2009) and Cuellar (2006).   
 
 
3.3 Main Characteristics of the Low-income Housing Mortgage Market 
 
Housing finance in Colombia is small compared to other Latin American countries. Mortgage 
loans ranged from 2.9 percent to 3.2 percent of GDP during the last five years, while the regional 
average is around 5 percent.6
Mortgage disbursements declined by 78.0 percent between 1996 and 2000, where non-
low-income housing disbursements registered the largest reduction (85.3 percent), while low-
income housing disbursements fell by 37.5 percent (Figure 2). This trend reversed after 2001 and 
mortgage disbursements grew steadily until 2008, but decreased in 2009 owing to the recent 
 After the financial crisis of the late 1990s, which lasted from 1998 
to 2001, the Colombian mortgage market recovery has been weak even with respect to total 
credit: while the ratio of total loans of GDP increased from 22.2 percent in 2001 to 28.5 percent 
in 2009, mortgage credit decreased from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2001 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 
2008. 
                                                 
6 Warnock and Warnock (2008). 
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economic downturn. Total disbursements reached a maximum in 2008, although they were only 
equivalent to 80 percent of the figure registered back in 1996. The recovery has been especially 
weak for non-low-income housing disbursements, equivalent in 2008 only to 73 percent of the 
figure observed in 1996. Disbursements for low-income housing performed better, rising in 2008 
above the 1996 level by 24 percent. In line with the recent growth of low-income mortgage 
disbursements, the share of the low-income housing credit portfolio grew from 32.1 percent in 
2002 to 44.0 percent in 2009, while non-low-income housing credit fell from 67.9 percent in 
2002 to 56.0 percent in 2009.7
 
 
Figure 2. Mortgage Disbursements 
 
Source: Financial Superintendency and Cuellar (2006). 
 
4. Housing Policy Instruments and Regulation in Colombia 
 
4.1 Subsidies 
 
4.1.1 Background of Subsidy Programs 
The Low-income Housing Subsidy was created in 1991 as the main instrument of a new 
demand-oriented low-income housing policy. Since its inception, the subsidy has had several 
modifications, but the general characteristics remain unchanged. It is a one-time direct subsidy 
intended to facilitate access to housing by the poorest households.  
                                                 
7 Data published by the Financial Superintendency of Colombia. 
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Since 1991, the subsidy has been managed and granted by four institutions: i) the 
National Housing Fund (FONVIVIENDA), a government agency serving families of workers in 
the informal sector (which replaced the former INURBE in 20038); ii) the Family Welfare 
Agencies9
FONVIVIENDA and the FWA manage the main share of resources available for the 
housing subsidy. These two entities allocated 72 percent of the subsidies from 1991 to 2009, 
while the MHPA and the Public Agricultural Bank allocated 15.7 percent and 12.2 percent of the 
subsidies, respectively, during the same period.
 (FWA) serving families of workers in the formal sector; iii) the Military Housing 
Promotion Agency (MHPA); and iv) the Public Agricultural Bank (Banco Agrario), operating in 
rural areas. 
10 The subsidy is financed by the national budget 
and by payroll taxes collected and managed by the FWA.11
Beneficiaries are selected according to two criteria: they earn less than four monthly 
minimum
 
12 legal wages as a family, and their living conditions rank among the lowest according 
to the SISBEN13 classification. Subsidies are allocated by a scoring methodology14
                                                 
8 In 2003, the government carried out an institutional reform of the housing sector. The responsibility for housing 
policy design and coordination was delegated to a new branch of the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Land 
Development Branch, creating the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development (MAVDT, for 
its acronym in Spanish). INURBE was liquidated due to inefficiency and lack of transparency and was replaced by 
the National Housing Fund (FONVIVIENDA). Some of the tasks formerly carried out by INURBE were delegated 
to third parties. Under the new system, the Family Welfare Agencies are in charge of the application process for the 
subsidies, FINDETER (a public rediscount bank) evaluates and authorizes social housing construction projects, and 
FONVIVIENDA allocates subsidies to families of informal workers.  
 that ranks 
applicant households according to their saving behavior (savings balances with respect to 
housing value or income and saving time) and socio-economic characteristics (household size, 
9 The Family Welfare Agencies (FWA), or Cajas de Compensación Familiar, are private non-profit entities that 
provide a range of social services, including low-income housing.  
10 Data published by the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and Territorial Development. 
11 In Colombia private enterprises pay payroll taxes equivalent to 14 percent of wages, from which 4 percentage 
points are managed by FWA.  
12 In 2010, four monthly minimum wages were equivalent to COP$2,060,000 (US$1,084). 
13 SISBEN is an indicator of households’ economic well-being, which serves as an instrument to target social 
programs. The index comprises a set of variables related to the consumption of durable goods, human capital 
endowment, and current income. The Social Housing Subsidy is targeted to households ranked in the two lowest 
SISBEN levels. Family income level is also used to target the program.  
14 This methodology was introduced in 1991, when beneficiaries were chosen by their highest score in the following 
criteria: previous savings, availability of complementary resources, construction materials and labor availability, and 
membership in a popular housing organization. The scoring criteria have had some minor modifications over the 
years (see Table 2). In 1993, the following factors were added: previous savings, Basic Unsatisfied Needs Index, 
housing solution type and value, population size in the municipality, and individual or collective application to 
subsidy.  
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female-headed household, and the presence of disabled or senior citizens in the household). 
Additionally, housing subject to the subsidy should have a maximum price of 135 minimum 
wages (70 minimum monthly wages for priority housing),15 and the highest value of the subsidy 
is inversely related to the household’s monthly income or the value of the house. The value of 
the subsidy granted by FONVIVIENDA was inversely related to the value of the house from 
1993 to 2007.16 To better focus the subsidies among households belonging to lower income 
ranges, the maximum value of the subsidy decreased from 1999 to 2007, especially for the 
purchase of housing worth more than 70 minimum wages. The real value of the subsidy 
decreased by 5.4 percent for priority housing and dropped by more than 35 percent for the 
purchase of higher value houses. From 2008 onwards17 the maximum value of the 
FONVIVIENDA subsidy was set to vary according to the beneficiaries’ income, allocating 
higher subsidies to families in lower income ranges. Additionally, the subsidy was restricted to 
priority housing.18
 
 
4.1.2 FONVIVIENDA’s Budget Distribution 
 
Subsidies managed by FONVIVIENDA are of special interest because they serve informal 
workers. The resources managed by FONVIVIENDA, which amount to more than a third19
                                                 
15 In 2010, 135 and 70 monthly minimum wages were equivalent to COP $69.5 million and $36.0 million, 
respectively (US$36,592 and $18,974).  
 of the 
total resources for housing subsidies allocated in Colombia, are distributed through various 
independent competition schemes, which have increased from two initial competitions in 2000 to 
10 in 2010. These competition schemes are designed to support different types of housing 
solutions and benefit population segments living in particular socioeconomic conditions, but in 
16 From 1991 to 1993, the value of the subsidy was delinked from the value of the house. Law 49 of 1990 
established a maximum value of the subsidy of 15 minimum wages for housing obtained in collective processes 
(where housing units should cost less than 50 minimum wages) and 12 minimum wages for housing obtained 
individually. Decree 2154 of 1993 set the maximum value of the subsidy granted by INURBE as follows: 20 mw for 
housing valued under 70 mw, 15 mw for housing valued between 93 mw, and 12 mw for housing valued between 96 
mw and 135 mw. For deed registration or land purchase the value of the subsidy was 13 mw, while for housing 
improvement it was 16 mw. This same decree set the maximum value of the subsidy granted by Family Welfare 
Agencies as follows: 23 monthly wages for households earning less than 2 mw, 15 mw for households earning 
between 2 and 3 mw, and 12 mw for households earning between 3 and 4 mw. 
17 See Decree 4466 of 2007 and Law 1151 of 2007 (Art. 86). 
18 This does not apply to Family Welfare Agencies as they are ruled by private law. 
19 On average 38.1 percent. 
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general all of them follow a similar methodology to rank beneficiaries according to the criteria 
described in the previous section.  
The competition known as Regular was the first scheme created to allocated subsidies to 
purchase new housing units directly from the market, invest in housing improvement, or build 
self-help housing. The second scheme put in place was the Territorial Effort, in response to the 
lack of housing supply in municipalities with populations below 50,000 inhabitants. This subsidy 
is allocated among housing projects carried out by local governments and is matched by 
infrastructure projects and/or land provided by local governments and by the Regular Subsidy 
obtained individually by households.20 The combined resources cover a large percentage of the 
cost of housing, helping families21
In 2004, three additional competition schemes were created. The first was the competition 
for Special Population, aimed at assisting families displaced by violence and victims of natural 
disasters or terrorist acts,
 with little access to the credit market and no previous savings 
to buy priority housing. 
22 all of which have increased in recent years. Under this scheme, 
previous savings are not required and the subsidy may be used to finance the purchase of existing 
homes, rent, self-help housing construction, or home improvement. Currently, the maximum 
value of the subsidy is equivalent to 25 minimum wages, compared to 22 minimum wages for 
the rest of the population.23 The second is the National competition, which promotes priority 
housing construction in municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants as well as macro-
projects, and complements the Regular Subsidy. Third, the Deed Registration competition, which 
allows de facto tenants of low-income housing located on lands owned by the government to 
legalize their ownership if they meet certain eligibility criteria.24
                                                 
20 The projects with the highest funding offered by the local government obtain higher scores in the competition. 
Under this scheme, each department has a budget quota and the competition is conducted among applicants from the 
same department (See the website 
 Under this scheme, the 
government provides the transfer of ownership and/or partial financing of the cost of registration. 
https://sites.google.com/site/socialhousingcolombia/ to obtain the formula used to 
distribute resources among departments).   
21 This subsidy is targeted to families earning less than two minimum monthly wages who apply to buy priority 
housing (housing worth less than 70 minimum wages). 
22 The last two groups were included in 2006. 
23 In 2010, 22 and 25 monthly minimum wages were equivalent to COP $11.3 and COP $12.9 million (US$5,963 
and US$6,776, respectively). 
24 See https://sites.google.com/site/socialhousingcolombia/ for detailed information. 
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Between 2006 and 2008, five more competitions were established: two of them aimed at 
subsidizing housing improvement and two at subsidizing the purchase of housing by households 
with members working in recycling-related activities and by city councilors living in 
municipalities under 50,000 people.  
Finally, the Saving with Favorable Credit Evaluation, created in 2009, is directed at 
households with previous savings and a certification of favorable credit evaluation. The 
distribution of FONVIVIENDA’s budget among these five competitions has determined the 
targeting of the low-income housing subsidy.   
As shown in Figure 3, total allocated subsidies registered an annual value of $916 billion 
pesos25 on average from 1991 to 1997. From 1998 to 2000, this average dropped by half, due to 
the reduction in the public budget for investment and social spending during the economic crisis. 
From 2001 to 2009, the allocation of subsidies recovered, rising to an average equivalent of 86.5 
percent of the level observed during the early 1990s. Of the total number of subsidies allocated 
in Colombia since 1991, 37.4 percent were allocated by FONVIVIENDA and 34.1 percent by 
the Family Welfare Agencies.26
Figure 3. Allocated Subsidies, 1991-2009 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development (MAVDT) 
 
                                                 
25 Approximately, US$482 million. 
26 See https://sites.google.com/site/socialhousingcolombia/ for more information on the execution of the subsidy by 
Family Welfare Agencies. 
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The number of households that benefited from housing subsidies registered its highest 
level from 1993 to 1997 (140,000 households on average) due to the greater number of subsidies 
allocated for housing improvement, which have a lower cost.27 The coverage of the program 
reached its lowest values from 1998 to 2000. From 2001 to 2008, the number of beneficiaries 
began increasing again due to the continuous reduction in the value of the subsidy, the 
introduction of new competition schemes with lower average costs, such as the housing 
improvement and deed registration subsidy, and the over-allocation strategy adopted in 2002.28
The average value of the subsidy surpassed COP $16.3 million (in 2009 pesos)
  
29
The subsidies managed by FONVIVIENDA’s competition schemes which were allocated 
to the internally displaced population
 in the 
period 1991-1992. From 1994 to 1998, the average value of the subsidy was relatively low (COP 
$6.4 million in 2009 pesos), due to the emphasis placed on housing improvement. Then, from 
1999 to 2003 it increased to COP $9.6 million and declined to an average of COP $7.0 million 
between 2004 and 2009.  
30
From 2003 to 2009, most of the subsidies allocated were used to purchase homes (82.5 
percent). The share of subsidies allocated for self-help housing construction recorded an average 
of 7.5 percent, while the use of subsidies for housing improvement grew from 0.2 percent in 
2003 to 8.6 percent in 2009, mainly due to the creation of two competition schemes specializing 
in improvement. The share of subsidies allocated for renting varied over the period and had an 
average of 6.2 percent (Table 3).   
 has grown to more than 50 percent of the total value since 
2007, when the National Development Plan (2006-2010) prioritized this population. Since the 
total amount of resources available for the housing subsidy is fixed by law, the rise in the budget 
for the displaced population has resulted in fewer resources for the rest of the population. In 
particular, subsidies allocated by the Territorial Effort competition fell from 38.6 percent in 2003 
to 10.2 percent in 2009, and the allocations of the Regular subsidy dropped from 39.1 percent in 
2003 to 0.3 percent in 2009.  
                                                 
27 Cuellar (2006) and Chiappe (1999) explain how from 1994 to 1997 the housing subsidy focused on improvement 
projects. According to Chiappe (1999), 38.5 percent of total housing subsidies were allocated to improvement 
projects. 
28 This strategy was implemented to ensure a larger disbursement ratio.   
29 Equivalent to US$7,560. 
30 In 2009, the total internally displaced population was 3.3 million (7.0 percent of the country’s population). 
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4.2 National Guarantee Fund (NGF) 
 
Partial mortgage guarantees, established in 2004, are provided by the National Guarantee Fund31
The NGF relies on the risk assessment made by intermediaries to final borrowers. This 
reduces operating costs and optimizes the information advantage that intermediaries have over 
the NGF. Intermediaries’ delinquency rates are constantly monitored. If an intermediary shows 
an excessive increase in its delinquency rates, its MPV is reduced in order to mitigate moral 
hazard. 
 
(NGF) to financial intermediaries holding mortgage portfolios. They are previously evaluated 
according to a risk assessment. A “maximum portfolio value to be guaranteed” (MPV) is 
assigned to each financial intermediary and, independently, they evaluate and approve 
guaranteed loans within the limits of the MPV. The guarantee becomes active when the arrear 
portfolio surpasses 18 months or when the financed housing unit is given as loan payment. 
The NGF guarantees the non-payment risk of loans for low-income housing. Loans 
subject to guarantees should not exceed 108 minimum wages32 or 80 percent of the housing unit 
value and should finance housing purchase, improvement, or self-help construction. The 
guarantee covers up to 70 percent of the expected loss33
  
 for individual loans with financial 
intermediaries or up to 50 percent of the outstanding debt for rediscount portfolio. The guarantee 
covers a period of seven years or less, and its monthly cost is 0.0943 percent plus VAT of the 
outstanding debt (COP $1,045 for each COP $1 million  borrowed); see Table 4 for a detailed 
description of the mortgage guarantees offered by the Fund. 
4.3 Programmed Savings 
 
Programmed savings accounts complement the subsidy and facilitate access to credit by 
signaling payment habits and the ability to pay. From 1991 to 1993, having previous savings was 
a prerequisite for applying for a housing subsidy.34
                                                 
31 The National Guarantee Fund (Fondo Nacional de Garantías), supervised by the Financial Superintendency, was 
created in 1982 as a mixed-economy entity to provide partial credit guarantees. Its stakeholders are the Ministry of 
Finance (60 percent), the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Tourism (20 percent), Bancoldex (12 percent), Findeter 
(7.2 percent) and the SMEs Union (ACOPI ) (0.8 percent). 
  Since most applicants could not satisfy this 
32 In 2010, 108 monthly minimum wages were equivalent to COP $55.6 million (US$29,274). 
33 This expected cost includes outstanding debt, non-paid insurance fees, non-paid interest, and collateral recovery 
expenses minus the value of the housing unit received as payment. 
34 Decree 599 of 1991. 
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prerequisite,in 1994 it was eliminated and became one of the scoring criteria for selecting 
recipients.35
Law 812 of 2003 and Decree 975 of 2004 re-introduced previous savings as a prerequisite 
to apply for the subsidy, but with no requirements on saving history and with a broader definition 
that included statutory guarantee payments (severances or cesantías), investment in land, 
progress in self-help housing construction, and savings in financial accounts that do not require 
regular deposits (aportes periódicos de ahorro). These requirements do not necessarily signal the 
borrower’s capacity to make regular payments to the financial system. Programmed saving 
accounts for low-income housing grew from January 2000 to April 2003 and stagnated from 
2003 to 2008, which may be associated with the relaxation of the saving prerequisite. 
  
The last competition scheme, introduced by FONVIVIENDA in 2009, known as Saving 
with Favorable Credit Evaluation, seeks to encourage the use of programmed saving programs 
and increase access to credit. The coverage of this scheme is still low (4.7 percent of the total 
subsidies). However, the outstanding balance of the programmed saving accounts started 
increasing in 2009, which may be associated with the introduction of this new scheme. Subsidies 
in this scheme were allocated mainly to families earning between two and three monthly 
minimum wages (73.2 percent) and 18.1 percent to families earning between three and four 
minimum wages. The remaining 8.7 percent was allocated to families earning less than one 
monthly minimum wage.  
 
5. Housing Subsidies, Housing Finance and Quality of Life 
 
5.1 Impact of Subsidies and Credit on Quality of Life  
 
Access to housing credit and housing subsidies is limited in Colombia. According to the most 
recent national census (2005), only 6 percent of the homeowners had a mortgage. The Quality of 
Life Surveys (QLS) of 2003 and 2008 showed similar figures (5.19 percent and 5.24 percent, 
respectively). 
 According to the QLS of 2003, between 1997 and 2002 only 13.54 percent of the 
759,658 homebuyers funded their purchase with a mortgage, a percentage that was higher in the 
                                                 
35 Decree 2154 of 1993. According to Law 633 of 2000 (Art. 69), families earning less than two monthly wages 
apply to the subsidy with no previous savings, as long as they have sufficient resources to match the subsidy. Decree 
975 of 2004 also eliminated the previous saving prerequisite for the special population, i.e., violently displaced 
persons or victims of natural disasters or terrorism.   
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QLS of 2008. Between 2002 and 2007, there were 1 million homebuyers, of whom 22.1 percent 
funded their purchase with mortgages (Table 5). The QLS surveys show that the main sources of 
funds to buy a house are savings, mortgages, and informal credit from friends or relatives. Low-
income households mostly use informal credit and savings, while high-income households rely 
mainly on mortgages and severance payments.   
Access to housing subsidies is even more limited than access to mortgages. According to 
the QLS survey of 2003, between 1997 and 2002 only 8.2 percent of homebuyers obtained a 
subsidy. The QLS Survey of 2008 does not provide the percentage of homebuyers that had a 
subsidy, but it shows that only 1.2 percent of the households had a housing subsidy between 
2007 and 2008 (Table 6).36
 
  
5.1.1 Housing Loan Borrowers and Housing Subsidy Beneficiaries  
 
Most households with access to credit share the following characteristics: they are located in 
urban37
 
 areas, they fall within the highest income quintile, and they are headed by a male who 
has more than 12 years of schooling, works in the informal sector, and is between 35 and 49 
years old. Most of the households that benefited from housing subsidies are also located in urban 
areas and are headed by a male who works in the informal sector and is between 35 and 49 years 
of age. However, in contrast to those with access to credit, the beneficiaries of the subsidy 
belong to the lowest income quintiles and their heads of household are less educated (less than 5 
years of schooling). 
5.1.2 Incidence and Targeting 
 
To analyze access by the poorest families to housing subsidies and mortgages we measured 
poverty using the Index of Unmet Basic Needs (UBN).38
                                                 
36 In 2003, the Quality of Life Survey asked for the funding sources of houses purchased between 1997 and 2002, 
including the housing subsidy as a possible source. In 2008, the QLS only asked whether a household had obtained a 
housing subsidy in the last 12 months, but the question was not related to the purchase of a house. The subsidy could 
have been already used or just allocated. 
 In 2008, 24.1 percent of Colombian 
households were poor (24.2 percent in 2003). The percentage of poor families who benefited 
37 Urban: Main Area of a Municipality=1, Rest=0. 
38 The Index of Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) is a measure of structural poverty based on the minimum level of 
physical and human capital necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs. The criteria for identifying a household as 
having an Unmet Basic Need are summarized as follows: 1) inadequate housing, 2) no access to utilities, 3) 
crowding, 4) school attendance, and 5) economic dependency. A person or a household is classified as poor if one of 
these basic needs is unmet. 
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from the housing subsidy was 23.0 in 2003 and in 30.6 in 2008. The percentage of mortgage 
borrowers classified as poor was even lower, only 15.8 in 2003 and 11.8 in 2008.  
Most of the poor families who benefited from housing subsidies and/or mortgages were 
headed by males who worked in the informal sector, were wage earners, married or cohabiting, 
with little schooling, and living in urban areas. Most of the borrowers classified as poor belonged 
to the 3rd and 2nd income quintiles, while most of the subsidy beneficiaries classified as poor 
belonged to the 2nd and 1st quintiles.  
The distribution of housing subsidy outlays by income level saw a slight improvement 
from 2003 to 2008. Families from the lowest four income deciles received 52 of the total subsidy 
outlays in 2003, while this percentage rose to 60 percent in 2008. Additionally, in 2008 some 
households belonging to the 7th to 9th income deciles had partially lost their participation as 
beneficiaries of the housing subsidy in comparison to 2003. However, it is not clear why non-
targeted households (i.e., households living on more than 4 minimum wages or monthly income 
above the 7th decile) were receiving the subsidy.  
 
5.1.3 Quality of Housing Solutions 
 
This section analyzes whether credit and subsidies have improved the quality of housing among 
the beneficiaries. The effect of housing credit and subsidies on quality of housing is measured by 
Propensity Score Matching techniques, using as outcome variable an indicator of the quality of 
housing and two binary treatments: access to housing credit and access to housing subsidy.  
The Quality of Dwelling (QoD) index is measured by a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA), which includes indicators such as access to potable water, sewerage, electricity, and trash 
collection services, as well as the construction materials of walls and floors and the availability 
of an independent room for cooking. 
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) attempts to calculate the impact of the treatment 
variables by creating a comparison group that would have been affected by treatment variables in 
a similar fashion to the treated group. The change in the outcome attributable to the subsidy or 
credit is therefore calculated as the difference in average values of the treated and comparison 
groups.  
The first step to perform PSM is to estimate Logit models in which the dependent 
variables are treatment dummies (housing subsidy and housing credit). The models are then used 
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to estimate the propensity score of being treated, given a vector of individual characteristics. All 
the models control for demographic and economic characteristics at the household level.39 The 
models also include interaction terms between each variable and region dummies to increase the 
goodness of fit, but this set of coefficients is not reported. Another criterion used to determine 
the final correlates for the logit models was the Balancing Hypothesis (or CIA), which states that 
there should be no statistical difference between treated and non-treated individuals with similar 
propensity scores in the mean of all the correlates used in the model.40
The second step is the matching based on the propensity score. One approach to match 
participants and nonparticipants is the Local Linear Matching (LLM), a nonparametric estimator 
that uses a weighted average of all nonparticipants to construct the counterfactual match for each 
participant. LLM estimates a nonparametric locally weighted regression of the comparison group 
outcome, in the neighborhood of each treatment observation (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 
1997). Under this approach we will match credit borrowers (subsidy beneficiaries) with other 
households that share similar characteristics but do not have housing loans (subsidies). Once the 
matching is made we will be able to compute the effect of housing credit (subsidies) on the 
quality of dwelling index.  
  
To construct the QoD index using the PCA, we take the first principal component since it 
summarizes the higher proportion of the total variance of the set of variables used in the analysis. 
In our case, the first component summarizes 29.7 percent and 22.2 percent of the total variance 
for the 2003 and 2008 quality of life surveys, respectively.41
We estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET) for 2003 and 2008. 
Results show a positive and significant ATET in 2003 (Table 8), which means that housing loans 
 The features of high-quality 
buildings are access to utilities, the use of bricks and prefabricated materials for the walls, floors 
made of marble, parquet, vinyl, or tiles, and having proper places for cooking. Table 7 shows the 
results of the Quality of Dwelling index (QoD), the outcome variable for the PSM. 
                                                 
39 The control variables include: household head’s age, gender, education level, marital status and work status, as 
well as household size, income, and residence location (urban or rural). 
40 If the Balancing Hypothesis is assured, then treated and control observations used in the matching process are 
very close to one another, at least in the set of observable characteristics used to predict the propensity score. 
41 In our case, all variables are discrete. Therefore, the PCA is applied on the basis of a tetra choric correlation 
matrix that explicitly takes account of the discrete nature of our variables. Hamill (2009) provides evidence on the 
importance of applying PCA to discrete data by calculating an appropriate correlation matrix to reduce biases in the 
covariance structure and avoid underestimations of the proportions of the explained variance. 
20 
 
and housing subsidies account for a positive and statistically significant difference in the quality 
of dwellings42
 
 between the matched treated (households that had a credit correspond to the first 
treatment, and households that had housing subsidy to the second treatment) and control groups. 
In 2008 we do not observe any effect of housing subsidies on quality of dwelling, although a 
significant and positive effect on quality of dwelling is observed for households that acquired a 
house between 2002 and 2007 and used housing loans as a source of funding. 
5.1.4 Quality of Life 
 
This section analyses whether credit and subsidies have improved living conditions among the 
beneficiary population. The effect of housing credit and subsidies on quality of life is quantified 
by Propensity Score Matching techniques, using as outcome variables a household-level measure 
of quality of life and two binary treatments: housing credit and housing subsidy access. First we 
explain some characteristics of the methodology used to construct the quality of life index and 
analyze the quality of life among the beneficiaries of subsidies and mortgages. Then, we explain 
the methodology and results of the estimation of the effect of housing credit and subsidies on the 
quality of life. 
The Quality of Life index (QoL) is measured through a Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA). This analysis includes indicators such as education level, children attending school, 
access to health services, economic dependency, crowding, housing conditions, assets, and 
subjective assessment of life conditions. To construct the QoL index we use the first principal 
component, which accounts for 30.5 percent and 21.4 percent of the total variance for the 2003 
and 2008 QLS, respectively.43
Table 9 displays the coefficients of each variable for the first principal component. The 
sign of each coefficient shows the relationship of each variable to the QoL index.  All signs are 
consistent with economic intuition. For example, if the household head is more educated and has 
access to health services, then the quality of life is positively affected. The index increases with 
better housing conditions, such as access to utilities, appropriate places for cooking, better wall 
 
                                                 
42 These are dwellings in the low-income housing group, according to the household income criterion of the low-
income housing program in Colombia. 
43 In our case, all variables are discrete. In this case, the PCA is applied on the basis of a tetra choric correlation 
matrix that explicitly takes account of the discrete nature of our variables. Hamill (2009) provides evidence on the 
importance of applying PCA to discrete data by calculating an appropriate correlation matrix to reduce biases in the 
covariance structure and avoid underestimations of the proportions of the explained variance. 
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and floor materials, and investments in durable goods. Subjective opinions about poverty and 
living conditions also have an impact on the quality of life. When households believe that they 
have better living conditions, their quality of life is considerably higher. 
To determine whether a household is poor, according to the QoL index, we established a 
threshold based on prior information of the percentage of poor households, according to the 
UBN definition of poverty (24.0 percent). Households whose QoL index is below 1.69 and 1.71 
(the 24th percentiles) in 2003 and 2008, respectively, are classified as poor.  
Beneficiaries of housing credit and mortgages differ in their quality of life conditions. 
The second panel of Figure 4 shows the distribution of the QoL index for mortgage borrowers in 
2003, which is concentrated in the higher values of the distribution. In contrast, the distribution 
of this index for the beneficiaries of the subsidy is less concentrated in the higher values of the 
distribution.  
Considering the QoL poverty threshold, we observe that few loans are made to poor 
households, whereas housing subsidies are likely to be allocated equally to poor and non-poor 
households. The results do not change dramatically in 2008 despite the fact that during that year 
a larger segment of the poor population benefited from housing subsidies (third panel of Figure 
5). 
To determine whether credit and subsidies are improving the living conditions of their 
beneficiaries, we use Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Housing credit and housing subsidy 
could be considered treatments, while quality of life is the outcome. To estimate the outcome 
effect of these treatments, the major concern should be the selection bias created by the rule of 
selection into treatment. Given our data, we consider that the best empirical strategy is to 
estimate the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) using PSM.    
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Figure 4. Distribution of the Quality of Life Index, 2003 
 
(a) All Households             (b) Housing Credit Borrowers 
          
 
(c) Housing Subsidy Beneficiaries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life Surveys (DANE) 
 
 
The estimation of the propensity score for treated and non-treated households, based on 
logit models, follows the same methodology as the one used in Section 5.1.2. Focusing on the 
local linear regression matching estimations, we find a positive and significant effect on quality 
of life as shown in Table 10, with the exception of housing subsidy in 2008. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the Quality of Life Index, 2008 
 
     (a) All Households                                                   (b) Housing Credit Borrowers 
    
 
(c) Housing Subsidy Beneficiaries 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 2008 Quality of Life Surveys (DANE) 
 
5.2 Determinants of Access to Housing Subsidies and Housing Loans 
 
Subsidies could facilitate access to a mortgage by low-income households. However, Colombia’s 
housing subsidy program requires a declaration of the amount of money needed to acquire a 
dwelling before receiving the cash transfer.44
                                                 
44 This is the case for every housing subsidy granted by the Family Welfare Agencies and for five out of the 10 types 
of subsidies managed by FONVIVIENDA (the Regular Subsidy and the Saving with Favorable Credit Evaluation 
Subsidy, as well as subsidies for Deed Registration, Recyclers, and City Councilors require complementary 
 Since credit is a source of complementary 
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resources, we identify a source of reverse causality between housing subsidies and housing 
loans, which leads to biased estimators if this is not controlled for. 
 
5.2.1 The Two-Equation Simultaneous System for Access to Low-Income Housing Credit and 
Access to Housing Subsidy  
 
While a dual relationship may exist between housing credit and housing subsidy, it is likely that 
access to a housing subsidy plays a more important role in explaining access to housing credit 
than vice versa, as households are able to prove additional sources of funding other than credit. 
We specify the following equations for credit access and subsidy: 
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                   
                                                                  
 
where, Crediti * and Subsidyi * are the continuous, latent random variables that represent, 
respectively, access to housing credit and to a housing subsidy. Within this framework, Crediti * 
and Subsidyi * are non-observable variables. However, the discrete dependent variables Crediti 
and Subsidyi  are observable, such that: 
 
 
 
Crediti =1 if household has a housing loan, and 0 otherwise; Subsidyi =1 if household has a 
housing subsidy, and 0 otherwise. Xi, is a vector of exogenous household socioeconomic 
characteristics such as household’s head gender, marital status, age, education level, and working 
conditions (formal/informal), as well as the number of household members and, an assets index45
                                                                                                                                                             
funding). In particular the Regular subsidy accounted for 39.1 percent of the subsidies allocated in 2003 (See 
Section 4.1.1.3). 
 
used as a proxy for wealth. Finally, to ensure that each coefficient in the system of equations is 
identified, certain variables are included in the housing subsidy equation and excluded from the 
credit equation and vice versa. In our model, Zi are two variables: a) a dummy variable of having 
programmed saving accounts or not, and b) an indicator of housing crowding, which are 
variables excluded from the credit equation. 
45 This index is calculated with PCA using variables of durable goods such as television, refrigerator, washing 
machine, automobile and computer. 
iiiii CreditZXSubsidy εθθθθ ++++= ** 3210
*** 210 iiii uSubsidyXCredit +++= βββ
)0(1)0*(1 3210 >++++=>= iiiiii CreditZXSubsidySubsidy εθθθθ
)0(1)0*(1 210 >+++=>= iiiii uSubsidyXCreditCredit βββ
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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The model is estimated using a sample of 750 households that acquired a new house 
between 1998 and 2002 and belong to the first seven deciles of the income distribution (i.e., low-
income housing). Each of the two-stage models consists of an equation for the probability of 
accessing a housing credit and another equation for the probability of accessing a housing 
subsidy. Recall that the first stage equations, which include all of the exogenous variables, are 
estimated for housing credit and housing subsidy. In the second stage, whether the household has 
a credit card is excluded from the housing subsidy equation. Similarly, variables that control for 
inadequate housing and inadequate access to utilities are excluded from the housing credit 
equation. 
Throughout this section, marginal effects are calculated as follows: the first-stage 
estimation creates predicted values for access to credit (Predicted Value: Housing Credit) and 
access to subsidy (Predicted Value: Housing Subsidy) that are continuous variables ranging from 
positive to negative values. An individual has access to credit if the predicted value is positive. 
Then, the weighted means of the predicted values are used to calculate the marginal effects. 
The results in the first column of Table 11 show that, after controlling for household and 
regional characteristics, a housing subsidy significantly increases the likelihood that a household 
has access to housing credit when the reverse causality is not accounted for. The second column 
of Table 11 presents the results from the second-stage probit model for the low-income housing 
credit equation. The results show that access to a subsidy does not increase the likelihood for a 
household to have access to credit, as was first estimated. Thus, not controlling for this source of 
endogeneity provides misleading results. 
In Table 11 we also observe the first and second stage estimation results of the housing 
subsidy equation. In particular, we obtain that programmed saving accounts is a significant 
explanatory variable that increases the probability of access to subsidies once the endogeneity 
with housing credit has been controlled for (see column 4). 
We do not find a significant effect of the probability of having a credit on the probability 
of having access to a subsidy, despite the design of the program, which in many cases requires 
having complementary funding. However, this is plausible given that most of the households use 
their own savings or informal sources of credit to buy their house.  
 
5.2.2 The Two-Equation Simultaneous System for Low-Income Housing Credit Access and 
Housing Subsidy Access Using a Private Bank Dataset 
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The effect of access to subsidy on access to housing credit is also estimated using data from a 
Colombian private mortgage bank (one of the most important in the mortgage market). The 
dataset has 33,689 housing loans, out of which 71.09 percent are low-income housing loans. 
About 54 percent of mortgage borrowers are households belonging to the 1st and 2nd income 
quintiles. 11.27 percent of the low-income housing loans are subsidized, and around 78 percent 
of borrowers who had a subsidy belong to the 1st and 2nd income quintiles. 
The effect of access to a subsidy on access to low-income housing credit is estimated 
using the two-stage Maddala estimation procedure. Results displayed  in the first two columns of 
Table 12 show a positive and significant effect of housing subsidy on housing credit, as well as 
variables such as the type of job contract (temporary workers are more likely to have access to 
credit than retired people) and using the loan to acquire a new house rather than a pre-existing 
one. The higher probability of having a housing subsidy positively affects the probability of 
access to housing loans in this bank. In particular, for low values of housing solutions, the 
subsidy might represent a considerable amount of such housing, values which in turn reduces the 
amount of money lent to low-income people. 
The credit score is the variable excluded from the subsidy equation. A higher credit score 
is related to a lower probability of default. It is observable by the bank and it is taken into 
consideration when approving a loan. The credit score has no relation to the allocation of 
subsidies. Additionally, we should account for some economic characteristics of low-income 
housing borrowers. These individuals usually have limited access to financial services and do not 
have credit histories. However, despite not having the best credit scores, they are likely to gain 
access to credit because of the availability of instruments such as the loan guarantee provided by 
the National Guarantee Fund.  
The probit model results in Table 12 also show that after controlling for the reverse 
causality with housing credit, the probability of having a credit does not affect the probability of 
having access to a subsidy. However, as was to be expected, people belonging to the lowest 
income strata are gaining access to the subsidy.  
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6. Housing Loan Guarantee Policy 
 
The Colombian government aims to help low-income households obtain affordable housing 
through a guaranteed mortgage loan program available through financial intermediaries. The 
National Guarantee Fund46
 
 (NGF) guarantees the non-payment risk of low-income housing 
loans. The guarantee covers up to 70 percent of the expected loss. These guarantees are provided 
to financial intermediaries holding a mortgage portfolio, but the final beneficiaries are the 
borrowers.  
6.1 Analysis of Implementation of the Guarantee Program  
 
The guaranteed loans administered by the NGF have different characteristics depending on the 
intermediary participating in the program. The most important intermediaries are banks which 
disbursed more than 80 percent of the total guaranteed loans between 2006 and 2009. The 
Family Welfare Agencies and the National Savings Fund participated with 13 percent and 2 
percent, respectively. The average Loan-To-Value (LTV, a ratio of the amount of a first 
mortgage to the total appraised value of real property) also differs across intermediaries. As 
shown in the left panel of Figure 6, the National Savings Fund lent, on average, at higher LTV 
ratios than Banks and Family Welfare Agencies and, therefore, assumes a higher risk of default. 
The figure’s right panel shows that the National Savings Fund is also providing the longest-term 
guaranteed loans (average duration of 15 years) followed by banks (average duration of 13 
years), Family Welfare Agencies (10 years) and cooperatives (9 years). 
 
                                                 
46 The National Guarantee Fund (Fondo Nacional de Garantías), supervised by the Financial Superintendency, was 
created in 1982 as a mixed-economy entity to provide partial credit guarantees. Its stakeholders are the Ministry of 
Finance (60 percent), the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (20 percent), Bancoldex (12 percent), Findeter 
(7.2 percent) and the SMEs Union (ACOPI ) (0.8 percent). 
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Figure 6. Average LTV and Duration of Guaranteed Loans by Type of Intermediary (percent of total) 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations based on private lender dataset. 
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However, the NGF does not select its program beneficiaries, as this is a task performed 
by the institutions that provide housing loans. Nor does the NGF have access to the profile of the 
guarantee beneficiaries. Despite this, we obtained data from the most important private lender 
participating in the program (we named this one “Intermediary 5”), so we are able to characterize 
the socioeconomic profile of the guarantee beneficiaries. We have information on 33,689 
mortgages of which 71 percent are low-income housing loans, 8.6 percent are subsidized and 17 
percent are guaranteed by the NFG. Of the total of low-income housing loans, 24 percent are 
guaranteed by the NGF. 
The typical NGF beneficiary of Intermediary 5 is a male, between 35 and 49 years of age, 
single, with a full-time job, a secondary education, and falling within the 1st or 2nd income 
quintiles. This profile is consistent with the profile of individuals who are less likely to have 
proper collateral to support their loan applications. Given that housing subsidies and loan 
guarantees are not mutually exclusive programs, around 13 percent of NGF beneficiaries also 
have a housing subsidy.  
Going further on the Intermediary 5 dataset, we also estimate a probit model to identify 
those features that make an applicant more likely to have an NGF loan guarantee. Results in 
Table 13 show that a high credit score47
The scope of the NGF program is low in terms of regional and portfolio coverage. The 
NGF program is still concentrated in some regions of Colombia. Bogota, Valle, and Antioquia 
account for more than 75 percent of the total guaranteed loans. Additionally, the percentage of 
low-income housing loans backed by the NGF was only 18 percent from 2006 to 2008.  
 (i.e., a lower probability of default) reduces the 
probability of having a guaranteed loan with this bank. This makes sense if such borrowers with 
poor credit history cannot provide any asset as collateral, other than their house. Individuals with 
no education have a higher probability of obtaining a guaranteed loan, as compared to 
individuals with higher levels of education. Regarding marital status, single borrowers are more 
likely to have a guaranteed loan than other borrowers. Loans for acquisition of new housing and 
for families with a higher number of dependents are more likely to have a guaranteed loan. 
Finally, the probability of having a guaranteed loan is lower as the household’s income increases. 
                                                 
47 The credit score is a score calculated by private banks based on some of the socio-economic characteristics of 
housing loan applicants. However, we do not have access to the information used in the calculation of this variable. 
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The regional coverage of the program reflects the limited access to financing in non-
urban areas of the country. Additionally, not many non-bank intermediaries, such as 
cooperatives, which have a larger presence in rural areas and low income segments, participate in 
the program. This might be also the result of different strategies followed by each region to 
promote the program. Finally, despite the obvious benefit from guarantees, some financial 
intermediaries do not make use of them. This may be related to the operational procedures 
required to participate in the program and to specific policies followed by each intermediary in 
their selection of borrowers. 
 
6.2  Credit Performance of Guaranteed Loans 
 
From 2006 to 2009, four financial institutions, which were among the biggest mortgage banks in 
Colombia, granted 69.3 percent of the total guaranteed loans. The performance of these loans 
differed among institutions. The second most important lender of guaranteed low-income 
housing loans (by size of its guaranteed loans disbursements) had 48 percent of the system’s 
guaranteed low-income housing portfolio in default. One plausible explanation for this has to do 
with the beneficiary selection criteria used by this lender. It is possible that this lender only 
offered guaranteed loans to bad payers. However, the lack of data prevents us from doing a 
proper assessment of this statement. As mentioned in the previous section, the NGF program is 
concentrated in the capital and two departments in the country. Therefore, these regions account 
for almost 80 percent of the total defaulted loans.  
We also used the Intermediary 5 database to analyze the explanatory factors of the default 
probability in housing loans. We ran two regressions: one for each type of housing loans and 
only for low-income housing loans. In the first case the odds of default increased when the 
housing loan was a low-income housing loan, when borrowers have lower levels of education, 
and when households have a larger number of dependents. However, when the loan is used to 
acquire a new house, a lower probability of default is estimated. It is possible that buyers of new 
housing are more averse to losing their homes, make a greater effort to preserve these assets, and 
are more committed to repaying their loans (see column 1 of Table 14). When we run the 
regression only for the sample of low-income housing loans we find similar results. Borrowers 
with characteristics such as having secondary education (as compared to higher education), 
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having more dependent household members, and higher income are more likely to default (see 
column 2 of Table 14).  
We also estimated the probability of default when the loan is guaranteed by the NGF. In 
the second column of Table 14, we observe that guaranteed loans are more likely to default than 
those which are not guaranteed. This is an interesting result as it suggests the loan guarantees 
schemes are not devoid of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. We also observe that 
using mortgages to buy new housing reduces the odds of default, as compared to using them to 
buy pre-existing housing.  
 
6.3 Estimation of the Impact of Loan Guarantees on Access to Housing Credit 
 
There are some limitations when assessing the impact of the NGF program on access to housing 
credit, such as the lack of data to build an appropriate control group and to identify those factors 
that determine the selection of beneficiaries by the financial intermediary. However, it is still 
possible to evaluate the effect of having loan guarantees on the number of new housing credits. 
The database provided by the NGF provides the number of guarantees by municipality 
from 2006 to 2008. We also have the number of new housing credits by municipality and by 
financial intermediary, annually, from statistics provided by the Association of Banking and 
Financial Institutions of Colombia (Asobancaria). Our sample has 62 municipalities across 14 
regions in Colombia. For each municipality we use annual data of regional GDP and for each 
region we use the regional unemployment rate. Another control variable used in our study is the 
proportion of regional savings accounts for each year of the period 2006-2008. This variable is 
used to approximate the level of access to financial services in each region. 
Given our data restrictions, we follow Cárdenas and Rozo (2007), who suggest evaluating 
the program taking into consideration its operation at different points in time. The NGF program 
was applied in each municipality at different points during the period of study, so we are able to 
estimate the effect of the program as the coefficient of a dummy variable with a value of one, 
from the year when the program started operations in each municipality and on. The 
municipalities in our sample are also comparable in terms of size (regional GDP), labor market 
variables (regional employment and unemployment rates), and financial variables (size of 
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regional mortgages and regional access to financial services as a proportion of savings 
accounts).48
The effect of housing loan guarantees is estimated with a panel approach at municipality-
level for the period 2006-2008: 
 
 
 
 
 
where, i denotes city and t year, Yit is the number of disbursed loans by city per year; Tt  is the 
year fixed effect; Pr is the regional fixed effect; Mm is the municipal fixed effect; NFGit is a 
dummy variable =1 from the year the NGF started operations in certain municipality and 0 
otherwise; and Wit are control variables (regional per capita GDP, regional unemployment rate, 
and access to financial services in the region).  
The estimation results are displayed in Table 15. We did not find a significant effect of 
the NGF program on the number of housing loans. One plausible explanation is the limited scope 
of the program, as described in Section 6.1.   
 
7. Conclusions  
 
This paper presented the results of a study of the characteristics and evolution of low-income 
housing in Colombia. The housing deficit in Colombia is still high, both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, and mainly affects low-income people. Access to credit, which could help 
improve housing conditions, is especially limited among the poorest households. Only 15.8 
percent of borrowers in 2003 were poor, a figure that decreased to 11.8 percent in 2008. Public 
policies, such as subsidies and the NGF program, have played an important role in improving 
housing conditions for the poorest, but have been insufficient to meet their needs. According to 
2003 and 2008 Quality of Life Surveys, only 4 percent of home-owning households had a 
mortgage and only 8 percent had access to subsidies.  
Subsidies are concentrated among low-income households, while most of the credit 
reaches only higher-income households. According to the UBN index, 23 percent of the 
households that benefited from subsidies were classified as poor in 2003, and this percentage 
increased to 30.6 percent in 2008. However, there is room for improvement in the targeting of 
                                                 
48 Therefore, cities such as Bogota, Medellin, and Cali were excluded from our sample. 
itititmrtiit WNFGMPTcY εβββ +++++++= 210)log(
(5) 
33 
 
the subsidy. Households from the first decile (poorest people) have a lower participation in the 
subsidy than households from the third decile. This may be related to the fact that the poorest 
families face considerable difficulties in accessing complementary funding, and the scope of the 
subsidy programs that do not require this type of funding is limited. Additionally our data 
suggest problems in the design and execution in the subsidy, because some of its beneficiaries 
belong to high-income deciles (seventh and ninth deciles). 
The propensity score matching estimators show that, in 2003, housing credit and 
subsidies had a positive impact on the quality of housing solutions and the quality of life. Results 
from 2008 were not significant because the available data was not suitable to design a proper 
control group. 
According to the estimation of the simultaneous model, using the 2003 Quality of Life 
Survey, having assets that can serve as collateral strongly increases the probability of obtaining 
housing credit. This probability is also positively affected by having a programmed savings 
account. The estimation of this simultaneous model using the private bank dataset showed that 
access to low-income housing credit is negatively affected by the borrower’s income level and 
positively affected by the household’s size and by having a housing subsidy. The probability of 
having access to housing subsidies is not affected by having access to housing credits, even 
though the opposite is significant and positive. 
Regarding loan guarantees from the NGF, we found that the program is focused on 
backing low-income housing credits, easing access to loans. However, credits backed with 
guarantees from the NGF are more prone to be in default, suggesting moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. We did not find evidence of any effect of the NGF program on access to 
credit, which may be related to the fact that the coverage of the program is very limited.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Access to Public Utilities and Physical Characteristics of Housing Units
Households in the First Two Income Quintiles 
Q1 Q2
Sewerage
No access 61,8% 43,7%
Access 38,2% 56,3%
Rubbish Collection
No access 21,0% 14,1%
Access 79,0% 85,9%
Wall Materials
Bricks 66,5% 81,3%
Wood 9,3% 6,6%
Disposable materials and Adobe 6,2% 3,4%
Other 18,0% 8,7%
Water
No access 40,4% 28,8%
Access 59,6% 71,2%
Electricity
No access 20,1% 13,6%
Access 79,9% 86,4%
Floor Materials
Cement 52,9% 49,3%
Vinyl, tiles, bricks 22,2% 37,1%
Dirt 19,7% 8,6%
Other 5,2% 5,0%
Source: 2008 Quality of Life Survey (DANE)
Table 2 Beneficiaries Ranking Criteria for Social Housing Subsidy, 1990-2010
Decree 
2154/93
Decree 
824/99
Decree 
2488/02
Decree 
4466/07
Socio-economic conditions
SISBEN Level or Score1 + + +
Basic Unsatisfied Index +
Household size + + +
Women headed household +
Women headed household, handicapped or senior citizen in the household +
Single-parent headed household, handicapped or senior citizens in the household +
Housing unit value - - - n.a.
Effort
Saving/Housing unit value + +
Monthly Saving/Monthly Income +
Saving/SISBEN Level or Score6 +
Saving time + + + +
Number of previous applications + + +
Source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development (MAVDT)
6Income level if the granting institution is a Family Welfare Agency
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Table 3 Assigned Subsidies by Type of Solution
(As a % of total value assigned)
Part. Real Growth  Part. Real Growth  Part. Real Growth  Part. Real Growth
2003 79,1            n.a. 20,6            n.a. 0,2            n.a.             -                n.a. 
2004 74,8 191,3 7,3 9,5 0,2 180,8 17,6              n.a. 
2005 88,7 13,3 8,2 7 0,3 54 2,7 -85,4
2006 93,3 26,1 5 -26,8 0,5 79,2 1,2 -47,1
2007 82,4 -3,3 3,2 -29,5 3,7 684,8 10,6 884,5
2008 75,8 -5 1,5 -51,3 13,2 267,7 9,4 -8,3
2009 83,1 -2,8 6,6 285,2 8,6 -42,3 1,7 -84
03-09* 82,5 36,6 7,5 32,4 3,8 204 6,2 131,9
Source: Ministry of Environment, Housing and Regional Development (MAVDT)
Notes: *Average; n.a: not available
 Purchase  Self-construction  Improvement  Renting 
Table 4 Partial Credit Guarantees for Social Housing
National Guarantee Fund
Estimated Loss - 
Findeter Rediscount - Findeter
Agreement Govt - 
Intermediaries Improvement 
Maximum Loan Value 108 mw 108 mw 54 mw 60 mw
Loan Purpose
Purchase, Improvement 
or Self-construction
Purchase, Improvement 
or Self-construction
Purchase Improvement
Coverage 
70% of the expected 
loss
50% of the outstanding 
debt
70% of the expected 
loss
50% to 70% of the 
outstanding debt
Housing Maximum 
Value 135 mw 135 mw 70 mw Any type of housing
Monthly Fee Charge
0.0943% + VAT 0.0943%+VAT Covered by the 
Government
0.1% plus VAT
Source: National Guarantee Fund
Table 5 Housing Credit in Colombia (% of households)
Housing Credit
No. 
Households %
No. 
Households %
No 656.792 86,46 780.037 77,89
Yes 102.866 13,54 221.404 22,11
Total 759.658 100 1.001.441 100
Sources: 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE), 2008 Quality of Life Survey (DANE)
Notes: * The survey provides credit information on dwellings acquired between 1998 and 2002.
          ** The survey provides credit information on dwellings acquired between 2003 and 2007.
2003 Quality of Life 
Survey *
2008 Quality of Life 
Survey **
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Table 6 Housing Subsidy in Colombia (%  of households)
Housing Subsidy
No. 
Households %
No. 
Households %
No 697.273 91,79 11.090.020 98,81
Yes 62.384 8,21 133.054 1,19
Total 759.658 100 11.223.074 100
Sources: 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE), 2008 Quality of Life Survey (DANE)
Notes: * The survey provides credit information on dwellings acquired between 1998 and 2002.
          **  Information on subsidies is provided for the previous 12 months before the survey was conducted.
2003 Quality of Life 
Survey *
2008 Quality of Life 
Survey **
Table 7 Results of the Quality of Dwelling Index
2003 2008
House Conditions
Access to water 0,3167 0,3229
Access to sewerage 0,3464 0,3443
Access to electricity 0,3238 0,3208
Access to toilet services 0,342 0,3518
Access to rubbish collection services 0,3474 0,3028
Walls made of Bricks 0,2983 0,2174
Walls made of  Adobe -0,0698 0,0266
Walls made of Wattle -0,0923 -0,064
Walls made of Wattle and daub -0,1421 -0,1149
Walls made of Wood -0,1644 -0,1898
Walls made of Prefabricated Material 0,0292 0,1577
Walls made of Bamboo, cane, another plant -0,1251 -0,1529
Walls made of Zinc, Cloth -0,1007 -0,1125
Floors made of Parquet, marble 0,1648 0,2214
Floors made of Carpet 0,2195 0,1725
Floors made of Vinyl, tiles, bricks 0,1857 0,1704
Floors made of Wood, Other plant -0,1421 -0,1234
Floors made of Cement -0,0762 -0,103
Floors made of Dirt -0,2348 -0,2412
Cooking in kitchen 0,1514 0,2091
Cooking in bedroom -0,0682 -0,1099
Cooking in livingroom with sink 0,0451 0,0115
Cooking in livingroom without sink -0,0546 -0,1323
Coooking in courtyard/corridor/outdoors -0,1935 -0,165
No place for cooking -0,0022 -0,0618
Component 1
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life 
Survey (DANE) and 2008 Quality of Life Survey (DANE)
39 
 
  
 
Table 8 Average Treatment Effects on Quality of Dwelling
Social housing (1st to 7th income deciles)
Treatment ATT P-Value Bootstrap Std 
Error
P-Value Bootstrap 
Std Error
Housing Credit 0.178** 0,035 0,084 0,028 0,065
Housing Subsidy 0.356*** 0 0,086 0,582 0,07
 provided during the previous 12 months before  the survey was conducted.
2003a 2008b
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE) and 2008 
    Note: a. The survey provides credit and subsidy information on dwellings acquired 
   b. The survey provides credit information on dwellings acquired between 2003 and 2007. 
  
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level
Table 9 Results of the Quality of Life Index
2003 2008 2003 2008
Physical capital
Human Capital Washing machine 0,22 0,21
No education -0,14 -0,12 Refrigerator 0,21 0,21
Primary Education -0,10 -0,09 Stove 0,22 0,17
Secondary Education 0,07 0,04 Computer 0,22 0,25
High Education 0,17 0,18 Vehicle 0,16 0,18
Children 7 to 11 not attending school -0,13 -0,09 Television 0,22 0,21
Access to health services 0,12 0,08
Subjective conditions
Socio-demographic variables Subjective poor -0,18 -0,18
High economic dependency -0,13 -0,12 Excellent life conditions (subjective) 0,12 0,15
Crowding -0,14 -0,16 Good life conditions (subjective) 0,08 0,09
Acceptable life conditions (subjective) -0,09 -0,12
House Conditions Bad life conditions (subjective) -0,08 -0,14
Access to water 0,21 0,18
Access to sewerage 0,23 0,21
Access to electricity 0,22 0,19
Access to toilet services 0,24 0,24
Access to rubbish collection services 0,24 0,19
Walls made of Bricks 0,20 0,17
Walls made of Adobe -0,06 0,00
Walls made of Wattle and daub -0,07 -0,05
Walls made of Wattle -0,11 -0,10
Walls made of Wood -0,12 -0,13
Walls made of Prefabricated Material 0,02 0,06
Walls made of Bamboo, cane, another plant -0,11 -0,12
Walls made of Zinc, Cloth -0,10 -0,09
Floors made of Parquet, marble 0,11 0,17
Floors made of Carpet 0,16 0,15
Floors made of Vinyl, tiles, bricks 0,12 0,14
Floors made of Wood, Other plant -0,09 -0,08
Floors made of Cement -0,08 -0,12
Floors made of Dirt -0,17 -0,19
Cooking in kitchen 0,12 0,16
Cooking in bedroom -0,07 -0,10
Cooking in livingroom with sink 0,03 0,00
Cooking in livingroom without sink -0,04 -0,09
Coooking in courtyard/corridor/outdoors -0,14 -0,14
No place for cooking -0,02 -0,05
Availability of bathroom 0,24 0,23
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE) and 2008 Quality of Life Survey (DANE)
Component 1 Component 1
40 
 
 
  
Table 10 Average Treatment Effects on Quality of Life
Social housing (1st to 7th income deciles)
Treatment ATT P-Value Bootstrap 
Std Error
ATT P-Value Bootstrap 
Std Error
Housing Credit 0.169* 0,091 0,1 0.161* 0,093 0,096
Housing Subsidy 0.379** 0,034 0,179 -0,059 0,667 0,137
 provided during the previous 12 months before  the survey was conducted.
2003a 2008b
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE) and 2008 
    Note: a. The survey provides credit and subsidy information on dwellings acquired 
   b. The survey provides credit information on dwellings acquired between 2003 and 2007. 
  
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level
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Table 11 Marginal Effects of the Housing Credit Equation and Housing Subsidy Equation, 2003
Social housing (1st to 7th income deciles)
Probit Maddala Probit Maddala
Model Adjustment Model Adjustment
Housing Subsidy 0.117***
( 0,251 )
Predicted Value: Housing Subsidy -0,033
( 1,737 )
Housing Credit 0.149***
( 0,211 )
Predicted Value: Housing Credit 0,152
( 0,000 )
Age of Head 0,008 0,01 0.008* 0.015*
( 0,054 ) ( 0,056 ) ( 0,029 ) ( 0,049 )
Age of head (squared) 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0.000*
( 0,001 ) ( 0,001 ) ( 0,000 ) ( 0,001 )
Female -0.055** -0.050* 0.064** 0.084**
( 0,284 ) ( 0,290 ) ( 0,147 ) ( 0,192 )
Household size -0,006 -0,006
( 0,056 ) ( 0,053 )
Informal Worker 0,005 -0,001 -0,036 -0,046
( 0,176 ) ( 0,174 ) ( 0,160 ) ( 0,168 )
Assets Index 0.047** 0.050** -0,006 -0,003
( 0,182 ) ( 0,198 ) ( 0,143 ) ( 0,191 )
Income quintile 1 0,004 0,016 0,062 0,081
( 0,271 ) ( 0,268 ) ( 0,244 ) ( 0,336 )
Income quintile 2 -0.038 -0,031 0,062 0,082
( 0,266 ) ( 0,319 ) ( 0,247 ) ( 0,342 )
Income quintile 3 -0,010 0,001 0,061 0,068
( 0,153 ) ( 0,221 ) ( 0,220 ) ( 0,305 )
Primary Education -0.139*** -0.150***
( 0,280 ) ( 0,310 )
Secondary Education -0.062*** -0.069**
( 0,252 ) ( 0,291 )
Married Head / Cohabiting couple -0,002 0,000
( 1,044 ) ( 0,357 )
Divorced/Widowed Head -0,027 -0,022
( 1,179 ) ( 0,418 )
Urban 0,014 0,004 -0.080*** -0.077**
( 0,229 ) ( 0,211 ) ( 0,170 ) ( 0,189 )
Head has a credit card 0,031 0,026
( 0,491 ) ( 0,485 )
Head has a programmed savings 
account
0.350*** 0.244**
( 0,297 ) ( 0,354 )
Crowding -0,008 -0,034
( 0,170 ) ( 0,211 )
Observations 660 641 814 624
Pseudo R 0,206 0,179 0,127 0,103
Source: Author’s calculations based on 2003 Quality of Life Survey (DANE) 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies not reported. 
Housing Credit Housing Subsidy
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level
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Table 12 Marginal Effects of the Housing Credit Equation and Housing Subsidy Equation, 2007
Social housing (1st to 7th income deciles)
Probit Maddala Probit Maddala
Model Adjustment Model Adjustment
Housing Subsidy 0.069***
( 0,075 )
Predicted Value: Housing Subsidy 0.144***
( 0,327 )
Housing Credit 0.018***
( 0,000 )
Predicted Value: Housing Credit -0,036
( 0,260 )
Credit Score -0.000045*** -0.000048***
( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 )
Temporary Job Contract 0.030** 0.032**
( 0,092 ) ( 0,092 )
Permanent Job Contract 0,017 0,020
( 0,089 ) ( 0,089 )
Age of Head -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002*
( 0,012 ) ( 0,012 ) ( 0,010 ) ( 0,011 )
Age of Head 0.000*** 0.000** 0,000 0,000
( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 )
Primary Education 0,099 0.101*** 0,000 -0,004
( 1,801 ) ( 1,741 ) ( 1,635 ) ( 1,574 )
Secondary Education 0,178 0,18 -0,001 -0,009
( 1,802 ) ( 1,739 ) ( 1,630 ) ( 1,575 )
High Education 0,157 0,157 0,006 -0,009
( 1,799 ) ( 1,739 ) ( 1,630 ) ( 1,575 )
Married head / Cohabiting couple -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.004** -0,006
( 0,034 ) ( 0,034 ) ( 0,029 ) ( 0,035 )
Widowed head / Divorced head 0,009 0,009 -0,003 -0,001
( 0,060 ) ( 0,061 ) ( 0,062 ) ( 0,076 )
Male 0,007 0,006 0,000 -0,004
( 0,032 ) ( 0,032 ) ( 0,029 ) ( 0,033 )
Loan used to acquired a new house 0.040*** 0.034*** 0.059*** 0.092***
( 0,031 ) ( 0,038 ) ( 0,043 ) ( 0,045 )
Log of household income -0.249*** -0.246*** -0.019*** -0.057***
( 0,033 ) ( 0,034 ) ( 0,029 ) ( 0,052 )
1st income quintile 0.063*** 0.146***
( 0,064 ) ( 0,208 )
2nd income quintile 0.039*** 0.112***
( 0,064 ) ( 0,204 )
3rd income quintile 0.014*** 0.064**
( 0,067 ) ( 0,181 )
4th income quintile 0,006 0.029*
( 0,068 ) ( 0,132 )
No. of dependent household 
members
0.018*** 0.018*** 0.002*** 0.005***
( 0,017 ) ( 0,017 ) ( 0,015 ) ( 0,017 )
Observations 18.976 18.537 28.388 18.252
Pseudo R 0,486 0,487 0,322 0,292
Source: Author’s calculations based on private bank dataset
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies not reported. 
Housing Credit Housing Subsidy
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level
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Table 13 Marginal Effects of the Loan Guarantee Equation
Dependent variable: Only
Loan Guarantee Social Housing Loans
Credit Score -0.000*
( 0,000 )
Permanent Job Contract 0,01
( 0,090 )
Temporary Job Contract 0,016
( 0,092 )
Age 0
( 0,009 )
Age squared 0
( 0,000 )
Primary Education -0,087
( 0,345 )
Secondary Education -0,114
( 0,343 )
High Education -0.173**
( 0,344 )
Married head / Cohabiting couple -0.042***
( 0,027 )
Widowed head / Divorced head -0,019
( 0,056 )
Male 0.012*
( 0,026 )
Loan used to acquired a new house 0.035***
( 0,027 )
Log of household income -0.183***
( 0,022 )
No. of dependent household members 0.027***
( 0,013 )
Observations 18.974
Pseudo R 0,163
Source: Author’s calculations based on private lender dataset
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies not reported. 
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level
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Table 14 Marginal Effects of the Default Equation Table 15 Marginal Effects of the effect 
of loan guarantees on housing loans
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: R.E. Dependent variable:
Default
All Housing 
Loans
Only Social 
Housing Loans
Housing Loans Model Housing Loans
Social housing loan 0.035*** NFG loan guarantees 
program (dummy)
-0,197 META
( 0,076 ) ( 0,314 )
Loan guarantee 0.014*** Regional GDP per 
capita (logs)
-2,299 NARIÑO
( 0,042 ) ( 1,981 )
Permanent Job Contract 0,013 0,011 Regional 
unemployment rate
-11.408*** NORTE DE 
SANTANDER
( 0,154 ) ( 0,162 ) ( 5,734 )
Temporary Job Contract 0,014 0,01 Bankarization of the 
region a
-63,062 RISARALDA
( 0,156 ) ( 0,165 ) ( 83,746 )
Age 0,000 0,000 2006 -0.897*** SANTANDER
( 0,013 ) ( 0,014 ) ( 0,302 )
Age squared 0,000 0,000 2008 -1,413 SUCRE
( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 ) ( 0,893 )
Primary Education -0,005 -0,007 BOLÍVAR -2,58
( 0,079 ) ( 0,081 ) ( 2,268 ) Constant
Secondary Education 0.009*** 0.012*** CALDAS -8.330***
( 0,043 ) ( 0,044 ) ( 2,176 )
Married head / 
Cohabiting couple
0,004 0,005 CAQUETA -7.469***
( 0,043 ) ( 0,045 ) ( 3,657 )
Widowed head / Divorced 
head
-0,003 -0,008 CESAR -3,8
( 0,091 ) ( 0,098 ) ( 2,951 )
Male 0,003 0,004 CÓRDOBA -8.494***
( 0,040 ) ( 0,042 ) ( 2,945 )
Loan used to acquired a 
new house
-0.008*** -0.011*** CUNDINAMARCA -2.529***
( 0,039 ) ( 0,041 ) ( 0,662 )
Log of household income 0,003 0.010** HUILA -5.842***
( 0,036 ) ( 0,041 ) ( 2,559 )
No. of dependent 
household members
0.004*** 0.005*** MAGDALENA -4,72
( 0,019 ) ( 0,020 ) ( 2,954 )
Observations 18.907 14.722 Observations 186
Pseudo R 0,048 0,025 Number of 
municipalities
62
Source: Author’s calculations based on private lender dataset Source: Author’s calculations based on
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies not reported. NFG dataset, DANE, and Asobancaria
Coefficient significant at ***1% level, ** 5% level, *10% level a. proportion of regional savings accounts 
to the total national
(1) (2)
